Wednesday, March 25, 2015

French Armour I




In June 1936 France still had only 194 modern tanks. These were 160 D1, 17 D2 and 17 B1 tanks. During the same year, the French army approved a new infantry tank, the diesel powered FCM-36. Meanwhile, General Gamelin laid down and got accepted a four-year rearmament plan on 7 September I936. This plan foresaw the formation of three 'divisions legeres mecaniques' (DLM) with S-35 and H-35 tanks, of two 'divisions cuirassees de reserve' (DCR) with B tanks (12 battalions) and fifty battalions of R-35 and FCM-36 light tanks to accompany infantry. The next four years were spent in establishing this force. In August 1936 the French government partially nationalised the larger industrial concerns including Schneider, Hotchkiss and Renault, in order to achieve its programme. A part of Renault became the AMX (Atelier de Construction d'lssy-les-Moulineaux) which soon expanded into another works at Satory. This state-run factory was principally engaged in the production of B tanks, R-35 tanks and R-31 tankettes. It also carried out design studies for the AMX-38, AMX-R-40 and for self-propelled guns. In spite of these measures, the inadequacies of French industry together with social troubles delayed the achievement and completion of the armament programme, with the result that the first 500 R-35 tanks, ordered in 1935 and 1936, were not completed until April 1938, while the 400 H-35 tanks ordered at the same time were not all delivered until October 1938.

At the end of 1937, it was decided to form the DCRs with four battalions of B tanks instead of six, so that there would be three divisions instead of two. However a decision of the Supreme War Council intervened next year and delayed the formation of the first two DCRs until October 1939.

When Poland was invaded by Germany on 1 September 1939, the French army had 1,670 light tanks R-35 and H-35, 100 light tanks FCM-36, 261 fast medium tanks S-35, 213 medium tanks D1 and D2, I72 heavy tanks B1 and B1-bis and 407 cavalry 'auto-mitrailleuses'. The French army still had some old vehicles, notably about 1,600 light tanks (Renault) FT and 6 heavy tanks (FCM) 2C.

#

In 1934 the French began experiments with purely armored formations in creation of their first Division légère mécanique (DLM, Light Mechanized Division). Essentially a cavalry formation, maneuvers involving the DLM revealed the need for heavier armament. This led to the Renault R-35 and the Hotchkiss H-35 tanks, basically downsized D-2s. These two were the most numerous French tanks in World War II. Both had two-man crews, but the R-35 weighed about 22,000 pounds and had an 82-hp engine, speed of 12–13 mph, maximum 40mm armor thickness, and armament of one short-barreled 37mm main gun and one machine gun. The French built about 2,000 R-35s and exported them to Poland, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The Germans later captured and modified a number of these for their own use and also converted some to artillery tractors and gave others to Italy.

The Hotchkiss H-35 had identical armament but was heavier, some 23,400 pounds. It had a 75-hp engine, top speed of 17 mph, and maximum 40mm armor protection. An improved model appeared in 1938. The H-38 was basically the H-35 with a more powerful, 120-hp engine and a higher rear deck to accommodate the engine and its cooling system.

These French tanks incorporated cast turrets and hulls. Although more expensive, they were not as resistant to shot as homogenous armor plate. They also incorporated Cletrac steering, which minimized power loss and improved cross-country performance. Instead of braking one track to turn, the system transferred power to the other tread by means of a differential and gear box.

The last French light tank before the war was the Hotchkiss H-39, officially the Char léger Hotchkiss, modèle 1939-H. The follow-on to the H-35, it mounted a long-barreled 37mm gun and one machine gun and had a more powerful, 120-hp engine. It weighed some 26,700 pounds, had a two-man crew, and was capable of 22 mph.

The Germans later utilized a number of these captured light tanks in the occupation of France, throughout the Mediterranean Theater, and in the initial invasion of the Soviet Union. They were also used by Vichy French and Free French forces in the Middle East, where some continued in Israeli service until 1956.

The H-35, R-35, H-38, and H-39 were all of high quality compared to the German tanks at that time. The chief drawback in the French tanks was probably their one-man turret. All three symbolized the French embrace of the doctrine of light tanks operating in support of infantry, a concept seriously open to question; French tankers deserved better.



HOTCHKISS H-39 LIGHT
Summary: Introduced just before the war, the H-39 was an outgrowth of the H-35, with a new gun and improved engine. It gave effective service in the Battle for France, although it was outgunned by heavier German tanks. The Germans used it in occupation duties. It was also employed by the Vichy French and Free French forces during fighting in the Middle East, where a number were taken over by the Israelis after the war and remained in service with them until 1956.
Production dates: 1939–1940
Number produced: Approx. 1,000
Manufacturer: Hotchkiss
Crew: 2
Armament: 1 x 37mm (1.46-inch) main gun; l x 7.5mm (.295-caliber) machine gun
Weight: 26,620 lbs.
Length: 13’10”
Width: 6’5”
Height: 7’1”
Armor: maximum 40mm
Power plant: Hotchkiss six-cylinder 120-hp gasoline engine
Maximum speed: 22 mph
Range: 93 miles
Fording depth: 2’10”
Vertical obstacle: 1’8”
Trench crossing: 5’11”

French Armour II




R-35
In 1934 the French began experiments with purely armored formations in creation of their first Division légère mécanique (DLM, Light Mechanized Division). Essentially a cavalry formation, maneuvers involving the DLM revealed the need for heavier armament. This led to the Renault R-35 and the Hotchkiss H-35 tanks, basically downsized D-2s. These two were the most numerous French tanks in World War II. Both had two-man crews, but the R-35 weighed about 22,000 pounds and had an 82-hp engine, speed of 12–13 mph, maximum 40mm armor thickness, and armament of one short-barreled 37mm main gun and one machine gun. The French built about 2,000 R-35s and exported them to Poland, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The Germans later captured and modified a number of these for their own use and also converted some to artillery tractors and gave others to Italy.

The H-35, R-35, H-38, and H-39 were all of high quality compared to the German tanks at that time. The chief drawback in the French tanks was probably their one-man turret. All three symbolized the French embrace of the doctrine of light tanks operating in support of infantry, a concept seriously open to question; French tankers deserved better.

Summary: Mid-1930s successor to the Renault FT-17 light tank designed for infantry support. Widely exported before the war to Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Turkey.
Production dates: 1935–April 1940
Number produced: Approx. 2,000; 945 available in the Battle for France (the largest number of any French tank of the campaign)
Manufacturer: Renault
Crew: 2
Armament: 1 x 37mm (.46-inch) main gun in turret mount; 1 x 7.5mm (.295-caliber) machine gun (coaxial)
Weight: 22,046 lbs.
Length: 13’9”
Width: 6’1”
Height: 7’9”
Armor: maximum 40mm
Power plant: Renault four-cylinder 82-hp gasoline engine
Maximum speed: 12 mph
Range: 88 miles
Fording depth: 2’7”
Vertical obstacle: 1’7.7”
Trench crossing: 5’3”
Special characteristics (positive/negative): A high-quality fighting vehicle with well-designed cast turrets and hulls and Cletrac steering; its principal drawbacks were its insufficient main gun and unsatisfactory internal arrangement of the one-man turret. The R-35 never achieved its potential because it was deployed piecemeal against massed German armor formations.
Special models: After the defeat of France in 1940, the Germans gave some R-35s to Italy and utilized others as garrison and training tanks or modified them for use as ammunition carriers and artillery tractors. Some also had their turrets removed and were employed as self-propelled gun carriers in coastal defense works.



R-40
The Renault R40 is the final variation of the R35. It was developed by the Atelier de Construction d’Issy-les-Moulineaux (AMX) which introduced a brand new and better suspension that consisted of 12 pairs of small road-wheels on each side mounted in pairs, vertical coil springs, and protective skirting plates. This vehicle mounted the long-barreled 37mm SA38 L/33 gun in the APX-R1 turret and had an AMX trench-crossing tail.  Just less than 120 tanks had been built from 10th May 1940 onwards and put into service with the serial numbers 51541 to 51658. They equipped the 40e BCC (30 R40 and 15 R35), the 48e BCC (29 R40 and 16 R35), and the reconstituted 28e BCC (24 R40 and 21 R35), also beginning June 1940, two Polish companies in France (companies "Pagézy" and "Chabowski" with 15 R40 each).
Weight: 12t
Length: 4.02m
Width: 1.87m
Height: 2.13m
Crew: 2 men
Maximum armor: 43mm (APX-R turret is cast and hull is cast armor + RHA bolted elements)
Maximum speed: 20-23 km/h (Renault engine, 4 cylinders, gasoline, 85 hp, 5880 cm3, water cooled)
Transmission: 4 forward, 1 reverse
Range: 140 km
Armament : a 37mm SA38 L/33 gun and a 7.5mm MAC1931 CMG (42 AP, 58 HE and 3000 cartridges - elevation of -16 to +20° and traverse of 5° right and 5° left but could be blocked to aim only with the turret rotation).
37mm SA38 L/33    
Theoretical rate of fire: 15 rpm
Traverse of 5° right and 5° left (could be blocked to aim only with the turret rotation)
Telescopic sight : 4x (L.767 telescopic sight, range drum up to 1400m for the APC shells and 1600m for the coaxial MG, field of view 11.25°, + reticule)
Practical AT range: 600-800m


French Armour Doctrine

FCM-36 light infantry tank


In France the problem was not so much equipment as tactical doctrines governing its use. As victors in World War I, French military leaders did not feel the need to change doctrines in the way that the Germans did. Senior French commanders of the 1920s and 1930s had learned their trade in World War I and did not understand the implication of changes in military technology for tactics and strategy. The French high command rejected outright the new theories of armor warfare and continued to view tanks in World War I terms as mere can openers in support of infantry. Besides, the French hoped to offset inferior numbers (in 1939, 40 million Frenchmen to 60 million Germans) by putting their faith in the defensive and artillery, as exemplified by the expression “stingy with blood, extravagant with steel.”

The French high command also rejected the notion of entire divisions of tanks. Some forward-thinking French officers, most notably Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Gaulle, argued for change. De Gaulle, who had been several times wounded and then captured, had spent much of the war in German prisoner-of-war camps, which perhaps helped allow him the reflection and detachment that others lacked. De Gaulle advocated a larger professional force formed on speed and maneuverability centered on armor divisions with organic artillery, motorized infantry, and air support. There is no indication that anyone on the French Army Council showed more than a passing interest in de Gaulle’s important book on armored warfare, Vers l’armée de metier (1934, translated into English as The Army of the Future). In all three of World War I’s victor states—Britain, France, and the United States—military nonconformity was discouraged. The U.S. Army’s two-division Armored Force was created only in July 1940, after the defeat of France.

The French, regarded by many observers as having the most powerful army in Europe, in fact lacked the ability to employ their military strength promptly and to good advantage. It was primarily a failure of doctrine rather than any equipment shortcomings that did in the French. The French Army divided control of its tanks between the infantry and cavalry. Infantry commanders saw the tanks solely as a means of infantry support; the cavalry regarded them chiefly in a reconnaissance role. Another consequence of this division was a multiplicity of designs.

Following the declaration of war, the French were slow to mobilize, and in the two weeks it required them to call up reservists and bring artillery from storage, it became clear that Poland was already collapsing. Even so, a vigorous French thrust would have carried to the Rhine with tremendous consequences for the course of the war, as the German strategic plan committed the vast bulk of German strength, some 60 divisions, to Poland and left only a weak force to hold the Rhineland. The latter numbered only 40 divisions (36 of which were untrained), with no tanks, little artillery, and few aircraft. The French moved belatedly and timidly and, after securing a few villages, withdrew the few divisions committed to the effort. Senior French and British commanders had rejected the new theories of high-speed armor warfare. They persisted in viewing tanks as operating in support of infantry, to be spread over the front in small packets rather than being massed in entire divisions.