FCM-36 light infantry tank
In France the problem was not so much equipment
as tactical doctrines governing its use. As victors in World War I, French
military leaders did not feel the need to change doctrines in the way that the
Germans did. Senior French commanders of the 1920s and 1930s had learned their
trade in World War I and did not understand the implication of changes in
military technology for tactics and strategy. The French high command rejected
outright the new theories of armor warfare and continued to view tanks in World
War I terms as mere can openers in support of infantry. Besides, the French
hoped to offset inferior numbers (in 1939, 40 million Frenchmen to 60 million
Germans) by putting their faith in the defensive and artillery, as exemplified
by the expression “stingy with blood, extravagant with steel.”
The French high command also rejected the
notion of entire divisions of tanks. Some forward-thinking French officers,
most notably Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Gaulle, argued for change. De
Gaulle, who had been several times wounded and then captured, had spent much of
the war in German prisoner-of-war camps, which perhaps helped allow him the
reflection and detachment that others lacked. De Gaulle advocated a larger
professional force formed on speed and maneuverability centered on armor
divisions with organic artillery, motorized infantry, and air support. There is
no indication that anyone on the French Army Council showed more than a passing
interest in de Gaulle’s important book on armored warfare, Vers l’armée de
metier (1934, translated into English as The Army of the Future). In all three
of World War I’s victor states—Britain, France, and the United States—military
nonconformity was discouraged. The U.S. Army’s two-division Armored Force was
created only in July 1940, after the defeat of France.
The French, regarded by many observers as
having the most powerful army in Europe, in fact lacked the ability to employ
their military strength promptly and to good advantage. It was primarily a
failure of doctrine rather than any equipment shortcomings that did in the
French. The French Army divided control of its tanks between the infantry and
cavalry. Infantry commanders saw the tanks solely as a means of infantry
support; the cavalry regarded them chiefly in a reconnaissance role. Another
consequence of this division was a multiplicity of designs.
Following the declaration of war, the
French were slow to mobilize, and in the two weeks it required them to call up
reservists and bring artillery from storage, it became clear that Poland was
already collapsing. Even so, a vigorous French thrust would have carried to the
Rhine with tremendous consequences for the course of the war, as the German
strategic plan committed the vast bulk of German strength, some 60 divisions,
to Poland and left only a weak force to hold the Rhineland. The latter numbered
only 40 divisions (36 of which were untrained), with no tanks, little
artillery, and few aircraft. The French moved belatedly and timidly and, after
securing a few villages, withdrew the few divisions committed to the effort.
Senior French and British commanders had rejected the new theories of
high-speed armor warfare. They persisted in viewing tanks as operating in
support of infantry, to be spread over the front in small packets rather than
being massed in entire divisions.
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